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The objective of this study was to investigate physicians' compliance with recommendations for drug substitutes 
embedded within an electronic medical record, to assess factors affecting compliance, and to evaluate 
associated cost savings. An exploratory study of all physicians in all clinics operated by a large health 
maintenance organization (HMO) was conducted using a transparent computerized agent that collected 1.21 
million prescriptions prescribed by 647 physicians. Compliance with HMO recommendations for substitute drugs 
reached a 70 percent rate. Substitute type, whether generic or therapeutic, was found to be the most 
significant factor affecting compliance, with physician workload and age second and third in effect 
magnitude, respectively. Compliance was found to be non-automatic and selective, following a thoughtful 
cognitive process. The HMO realized at least a 4 percent reduction in costs for prescribed drugs as a result of 
compliance with substitute recommendations. The results can be interpreted via the lens of Organizational 
Justice Theory, assuming that the broad compliance with generic substitutes was driven by perception of just 
procedures, whereas there was no such perception in the case of therapeutic substitutes. While more research 
is warranted for investigating the motivations driving physicians' compliance, we strongly feel that the results 
can be generalized to other HMOs and healthcare settings. 
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1. Introduction 
Healthcare costs are escalating world-wide. According to a 2006 report of the Organization for 
Economic and Co-operation Development (OECD) (figures for later years are yet to be published), 
national healthcare expenditures ranged from 15.3 percent (U.S.) to 6 percent (Mexico, Korea, 
Poland) of countries’ Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Annual growth rates between the years 2000 
and 2006 were above 10 percent in several countries, surpassing the growth of the respective 
economies (OECD, 2007; Schur, Berk, & Yegian, 2004). Spending on prescription drugs in the US, for 
example, increased by 14 percent between 2004 and 2007 (Daly, 2007), and drug expenditures 
exceeded 12 percent of the total healthcare expenditure in 2006 (KFF, 2007). 
 
Interventions used by insurers to contain drug costs frequently require physicians' compliance. When 
compliance is not forthcoming, cost containment is not achieved. In other cases, achievement of cost 
containment has resulted in a decrease in quality of care (Shamliyan, Duval, Du, & Kane, 2008). 
While electronic medical records systems (EMR) have been advocated as a means for meeting these 
cost and quality challenges, recent studies have marginally substantiated this assertion (Delpierre et 
al., 2004; DesRoches et al., 2008; Shamliyan et al., 2008; Wolfstadt et al., 2008). Two obstacles to 
achieving these goals are physicians' resistance (Piderit, 2000) and their preference to maintain 
existing behaviors (Coch & French, 1948). In this sense, a compliant behavior has been used as 
evidence of reduced resistance (Sagie, Elizur, & Greenbaum, 1985), which health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs) strive to secure in order to achieve enhanced quality of healthcare while 
containing costs. 
 
Voluntary EMR adoption by independent care providers can be regarded to some degree as 
compliance with governmental requests (Goldman, 2009) and is believed to enhance healthcare 
efficiency (Ginsburg, Doherty, Ralston, & Senkeeto, 2008; Matheny et al., 2008; Mongan, Ferris, & 
Lee, 2008; Reynolds, Harper, Jenner, & Dunne, 2008; Shamliyan et al., 2008; Weber, 2008; Wolfstadt 
et al., 2008). However, in spite of two decades of efforts, EMR adoption rates are still only around 14 
percent of primary care physicians in the US (DesRoches et al., 2008). Among reasons for non-
adoption of EMR technology are: questionable return on investment, risks of privacy breach or 
records unavailability, user interface difficulties, and questionable effectiveness (Blumenthal, 2009; 
Jha et al., 2009a, 2009b; Kush, Helton, Rockhold, & Hardison, 2008; Martens et al., 2008; Shachak, 
Hadas-Dayagi, Ziv & Reis, 2009; Vardy, Kayam, & Kitai, 2008). HMOs that have adopted EMRs 
encounter similar difficulties, confronting internal resistance to use the systems and comply with new 
organizational processes (Connell & Young, 2007; Jensen & Aanestad, 2007; Reardon & Davidson, 
2007; Subramanian et al., 2007). 
 
While the rates of EMR adoption or non-adoption is by now fairly clear, this is not the case for care 
provider compliance with computerized notifications embedded within implemented EMRs to improve 
quality of care or reduce costs. Recent studies focusing on the effectiveness of computerized 
reminders yielded mixed results (Matheny et al., 2008; Sequist et al., 2005), with effectiveness 
declining over time (Demakis et al., 2000). Most of this research was conducted in institutions where 
the investigated behavior involved recently implemented systems or experimental environments, 
hindering the generalizability of the results. 
 
Against this background, the objective of this study was to examine physicians' compliance with a well-
established intervention to contain costs of prescription drugs without decreasing the quality of care 
administered by a large HMO. We conducted the study in the normal organizational environment, where 
we transparently monitored the natural behavior of the physician population employed by the studied 
HMO in all its clinics. The intervention involved a notification about HMO-recommended substitutes 
issued to the physician by the drug prescription module of the EMR. We examined the patterns of 
physicians’ compliance with notifications, both in general and in relation to their demographic traits, as 
well as the contribution of compliance to containment of drug costs. We employed an exploratory 
epistemology, hence, we did not attempt to test any hypotheses. Rather, we wanted to examine the 
actual physicians' behavior and suggest a plausible theoretical explanation for future research. 
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The strength and importance of this work is in the comprehensiveness of the data, which is rooted in 
a normal organizational setting, in the rigorous statistical analyses, and in the theoretical and practical 
implications derived. Furthermore, although the results represent one organization, we are confident 
in their generalizability and external validity under similar circumstances.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: the next two sections present the background, including review of 
the literature, description of the study environment, and explanation of the theoretical lens for this 
paper, followed by the research method. We then present the results, leading to the discussion and 
conclusions. 
2. Background 
Drug prescription is a primary component of medical care, yet it suffers from quality and cost 
problems and ineffective response to administrative measures that address both these concerns 
(Kuperman & Gibson, 2003; Shamliyan et al., 2008). To overcome cost problems, several cost 
containment measures have been attempted, of which the most common are: (1) administering drug 
formularies (Huskamp et al., 2005); (2) shifting to generic-drug-only coverage (Patterson et al., 2005); 
and (3) instituting co-payments (Gibson, Ozminkowski, & Goetzel, 2005). All three measures, 
however, although successful in achieving cost containment (Huskamp et al., 2003a), are contingent 
on care providers' compliance with organizational procedures, and can also bear undesirable health 
consequences (Gibson et al., 2005) when patients, particularly sensitive populations such as elderly 
patients, deviate from disciplined drug consumption due to financial difficulties (Goldman et al., 2004; 
Huskamp et al., 2003b; Reed, Brand, Newhouse, Selby, & Hsu, 2008; Steinman, Sands, & Covinsky, 
2001). 
 
Prior research about physicians' compliance with various manual or computerized clinical procedures, 
introduced to increase quality of care, reduce costs, or minimize errors, generally revealed either 
marginal success or none (Matheny et al., 2008; Sanders & Satyvavolu, 2002; Sequist et al., 2005; 
Tamblyn et al., 2006). 
 
Physicians' response to clinical reminders can be divided into four behavioral categories: compliance, 
reliance, spillover, and reactance. Compliance is defined as the tendency to perform an action when a 
clinical monitor issues an alert; reliance is defined as a tendency to refrain from performing an action 
when the warning system does not indicate that it is necessary (Meyer, 2004); spillover is defined as 
"the spread or expansion of responses, activities, or roles from one instance, system, or domain, to 
another" (Vashitz et al., 2009, p. 318); and reactance (or non-compliance) is defined as "an 
unpleasant motivational state, in which people react to situations [where] they feel their autonomy is 
threatened, in ways that reaffirm their freedom or autonomy" (Vashitz et al., 2009, p. 318). Barriers to 
compliance with clinical reminders identified by prior research include lack of time, poor patient 
compliance, and physicians' lack of knowledge of, awareness to, or disagreement with specific 
guidelines (Sequist et al., 2005). User interface and other usability issues were likewise identified as 
hindering adherence to clinical reminders (Patterson et al., 2005), as well as workload and patient 
characteristics (Mayo-Smith & Agrawal, 2007; Sittig, Krall, Dykstra, Russell, & Chin, 2006). 
 
As elaborated upon next, the HMO under study here employed a combined policy of drug formulary, 
co-payment, and differentiated cost coverage based on the type of drug prescribed. The policy was 
administered via a computerized drug prescription module embedded in an EMR whose use is 
mandatory yet open to various levels of compliance. 
2.1. Description of the Study Environment 
Israeli citizens are fully insured through the Israeli National Insurance Law, and can enroll with one of 
four HMOs that provide full health coverage to their members. EMR systems have been widely 
implemented in Israel since the early 1990s. All primary care physicians, as well as practitioners in 
most secondary care clinics of the studied HMO have been using the studied EMR system for nearly 
20 years (Pliskin, 1994; Pliskin, Glezerman, Modai, & Weiler, 1996). The other three HMOs either use 
this same or a similar EMR system. Thus, all primary care and the vast majority of secondary 
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healthcare records in Israel are fully computerized. The EMR system facilitates electronic real-time 
documentation of all physician-patient encounters during a visit and selective context-based data 
retrieval during treatment monitoring, including various clinical alerts and decision aids. In addition to 
order entry for drugs (via a built-in drug-prescription module), the EMR system supports such 
processes as laboratory referrals, expert consultation and imaging, and a bi-directional interface with 
administrative computerized systems, used to validate patient coverage and transmit various 
administrative data, for example, for cost calculation purposes. Based on DeRoches et al.'s (2008) 
classification, this is a comprehensive EMR. 
 
The built-in drug prescription module, which is the only method practiced at the HMO for generating 
drug prescriptions, displays clinical details relevant to the prescription process, including patient 
clinical information, current and previous drugs prescribed to the patient, alerts of drug contradictions 
upon prescribing new drugs, and known allergies or sensitivities. The system also presents a list of 
drugs from which the physician may select. The list (see Figure 1) reflects the HMO's drug formulary, 
where drugs are ordered from the most to least preferred according to the HMO policy for drug 
coverage. The list contains ample information about each drug, some visible and some available 
upon clicking (e.g., administrative and pharmacological information). The first time a prescription is 
called for, the physicians may select any drug from the list as an initial choice. Upon prescribing a 
non-preferred drug, the drug-prescription module notifies the physician about available HMO-
preferred generic substitutes (where the substitute is identical in chemical formulation to the patent 
drug) or therapeutic substitutes (where the substitute is not identical but is known to yield similar 
therapeutic results). More specifically, when a physician prescribes a non-preferred drug as an initial 
choice, the notification screen pops up and notifies the physician in real time: "Have you considered 
prescribing XXXX?" (See Appendix 1) The physician can then either choose the proposed preferred 
substitute instead of his/her initial choice. However, if the notification is ignored and the final choice is 
the same as the initial choice, s/he is asked to fill out an online form and explain the reasons for non-
compliance (See Appendix 2). Physicians know that HMO administration can access these forms and 
examine their explanations. This feature is activated only for drugs with HMO-preferred substitutes 









Figure 1. The Drug Prescription Module 
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2.2. Compliance as an Organizational Behavior–the Organizational Justice Lens 
The present exploratory study aimed to examine a behavior rather than to substantiate theoretical 
hypotheses. Yet, there is merit in a post-hoc theoretical interpretation of the factors found to affect 
compliance, believed to be a desirable organizational behavior, linked to other positive organizational 
outcomes such as job satisfaction, organizational commitment, withdrawal, and organizational 
citizenship (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001).  
 
Of the four types of adherence behavior defined by Vashitz et al. (2009)--compliance, reliance, 
spillover, and reactance--physicians in the present study could only demonstrate compliance or 
reactance behaviors. Thus, we define compliance as adherence to drug substitute notification, either 
initially (self-compliance) or in response to a notification (assisted compliance). Non-compliance or 
reactance is refusal to adhere to a drug substitute recommendation even after being notified. 
 
Two quite different theories that attempt to explain compliance behavior are the deterrence model and 
the accommodative model (Kagan & Scholz, 1984). The deterrence theory argues that people are 
motivated entirely by profit-seeking, assessing opportunities and risks and disobeying when the 
anticipated risks are small compared with the profits to be made through non-compliance (Kagan & 
Scholz, 1984). Advocates of the deterrence view believe that individuals will only comply with an 
authority’s rules and decisions when confronted with harsh sanctions and penalties. Clearly, this was 
not the case in the studied HMO, where physicians neither directly benefited from complying, nor 
were penalized for not complying. The accommodative theory maintains that attitudes and moral 
obligations, in addition to economic calculations or fear of punishment, are important in explaining 
compliance behavior and, therefore, need to be considered when managing non-compliance 
(Braithwaite, 2002). 
 
Related to the accommodative model of compliance behavior is Tyler’s (1990) theory on compliance, 
according to which, people’s compliance behavior is strongly linked to views about justice and 
injustice. In particular, he suggests that procedural justice plays an important role in peoples’ 
decisions to comply with rules and regulations. Procedural justice is a refinement of the organizational 
justice or fairness theory, which initially dealt with the fairness of outcome distribution or allocation 
and the fairness of the procedures used to determine this distribution or allocation (Adams, 1965). 
This type of organizational justice was termed distributive justice (Leventhal, 1976). Later work 
introduced the concept of the fair process effect into the organizational justice literature, termed 
procedural justice (Folger, 1977; Leventhal, 1976; Lind & Tyler, 1988). 
 
Procedural justice concerns the perceived fairness of the procedures involved in decision making and 
the perceived treatment one receives from a decision maker. The procedural justice literature 
demonstrates that people’s reactions to their personal experiences with authorities are rooted in their 
evaluations of the fairness of the procedures those agencies use to exercise their authority (Lind & 
Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2000). A procedure should meet six criteria to be perceived as fair: a) be 
applied consistently across people and across time; b) be free from bias (e.g., ensuring that a third 
party has no vested interest in the particular settlement); c) ensure that accurate information is 
collected and used in making decisions; d) have some mechanism to correct flawed or inaccurate 
decisions; e) conform to personal or prevailing standards of ethics or morality; and f) ensure that the 
opinions of various groups affected by the decision have been taken into account (Colquitt et al., 
2001; Leventhal, 1976). 
 
Focusing on the importance of interpersonal treatment people receive when procedures are 
implemented, Bies and Moag (1986) suggested differentiating interactional justice from procedural 
justice. Further work (Greenberg, 1990; Greenberg, 1993) hypothesized interpersonal justice to 
consist of two dimensions: interactional justice, which refers to the degree to which people are treated 
with politeness, dignity, and respect by the authorities involved in executing procedures, and 
informational justice, which focuses on the explanations provided to people that convey information 
about why procedures were used in a certain way (Colquitt et al., 2001). There are, however, 
conflicting results concerning the discriminant validity of procedural justice, interactional, and 
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informational justice, therefore, many researchers (see Colquitt et al., 2001 for details) have 
operationalized procedural justice by measuring process control as suggested by Leventhal (1976) 
along with interactional and informational justice in one combined scale. 
 
There is empirical evidence to show that people who feel they have been treated in a procedurally fair 
manner by an organization will be more inclined to accept its decisions and follow its directions (Lind 
& Tyler, 1988; Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996). It has also been found that people are more likely to 
challenge a situation collectively when they believe that the procedures are unfair (Greenberg, 1987; 
Murphy, 2003; Tyler, 1990). 
 
Organizational justice theory is relevant to the context of this study because the drug substitute 
intervention studied here affects physicians' professional autonomy and self esteem, and because the 
issuing HMO clearly has vested interests in the outcomes, as have the patients. Therefore, we chose 
to explain the results via this lens, as further elaborated in the concluding section. 
3. Research Methods 
3.1. Research Approach 
As previously stated, the present study adopts the interpretive, exploratory epistemology, aiming to 
examine routine behaviors of physicians who are proficient users of a drug prescription module within 
an EMR that includes drug substitution notifications. 
3.2. Studied Intervention 
At the time of the study, the HMO's catalog included about 2,600 drugs, to which substitutes (either 
generic or therapeutic) were offered for 1,443 drugs in 47 pharmacological groups. In describing the 
studied intervention, italics highlight the terminology used:  
 
The intervention is activated upon a physician prescribing a first-time prescription for a drug with 
substitutes (a satisfying prescription), as opposed to a repeat prescription, where the same drug is re-
prescribed for the patient. If at start time the physician's initial choice is a preferred drug (e.g., from 
the top of the list), s/he is exhibiting self-compliance behavior. If not, s/he is notified about 
recommended substitutes (Appendix 1) and can choose a preferred drug as a final choice, thus 
exhibiting assisted-compliance behavior. Otherwise, an online form appears and the physician is 
asked to specify the reasons for the non-compliance behavior (Appendix 2). The response time is the 
time elapsed between the initial and final choices (which equals zero for self-compliance), including 
the time required to fill out the form following non-compliance.  
3.3. Study Design and Administration 
Data collection for the study lasted 40 consecutive weeks from June 1, 2005 to February 28, 2006. To 
collect data for this study, a transparent computerized agent was embedded into the drug prescription 
module, recording for the entire physician population in all 176 primary care clinics of the HMO, and 
for each prescription: the physician's ID, patient age, visit date and time, initial drug choice, final drug 
choice, and the time elapsed between the two. Physician demographics were provided by the HMO 
whose management approved the data collection. Physicians were unaware of the data collection; 
hence, regular work practices were not disrupted and no bias was suspected. Data recorded by the 
computerized agent were stored in real time in an MS-Access 2003 database and analyzed using 
SPSS version 17.0.  
3.4. Sample 
We collected about 5 million prescriptions written by 2,120 physicians. However, only about 1.2 
million prescriptions, prescribed by 647 physicians, were for satisfying prescriptions, invoking the 
studied intervention because they were first-time prescriptions for drugs with substitutes.  
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3.5. Statistical Analyses 
We used the following methods: cross-tab analysis for the descriptive statistics; independent-samples 
t-test for comparing means between self-employed and HMO-employed physicians; and multinomial 
logistic regression for compliance analyses, with the dependent variable being the three compliance 
types (1=self, 2=assisted, and 3=non) and the independent variables being substitution type 
(1=generic, 2=therapeutic), employment type (1=self-employed, 2=HMO-employed), domain (1=GP, 
2=specialist), gender (1=male, 2=female), country of medical education (1=Eastern Europe, 
2=Western Europe, 3=North America, 4=South America, 5=Israel), average number of patient visits 
per day, physician age, tenure with the HMO, and patient age. We standardized quantitative variables 
indicating years or visits to cater to unit differences. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values for the 
independent variables were around 1, indicating lack of multicollinearity. We employed a forward 
stepwise entry method with score as the entry criterion and Wald as the removal criterion. 
Additionally, we checked two-way interactions for all variables except country of education (because 
of numerous combinations, the reporting of which is beyond the scope of this study). None of the 
interaction effects was practically significant as the odds ratios were close to 1 (although all were 
statistically significant due to the large sample). We examined correlations using univariate two-tailed 
Pearson correlations. We assessed the lower bound on cost savings by calculating the difference 
between the costs of the initial and final choices in the assisted-compliance group. 
4. Results 
4.1. Sample Description 
We present descriptive statistics of the sample in Table 1. Two hundred ninety-seven (46 percent) of 
the participating physicians were self-employed, whereas 350 (54 percent) were HMO-employed. The 
percentage of specialists in the self-employed group (53 percent) was significantly higher than in the 
HMO-employed group (22 percent), the rest being GPs. These two groups significantly differed on 
several traits, such as average number of work days (self-employed worked more) and average 
number of patients treated per day (self-employed treated more). The two groups, however, were not 
significantly different in terms of age, average tenure on the job, and number of patient visits yielding 
prescriptions. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Self-employed HMO-employed Total Significance 
Number of physicians 297 350 647 P<0.001 
Number of General Practitioners/ 
Specialists 140 / 157 274 / 76 414 / 233 P<0.001 
Average physician age (S.D.)1 48.8 (7.7)  48.06 (9.17) 48.4 (8.53) n.s. 
Average (S.D.) tenure on the job 9.17 (5.3) 9.12 (5.2) 9.14 (5.26) n.s. 
Percent of females 41% 62% 52 % P<0.001 
Average (S.D.) number of work days 
per physician during the study period 140.98 (55.53) 125.34 (48.72) 132.52 (52.5) P<0.001 
Average (S.D.) number of patient 
visits per day 28.9 (17.18) 21.92 (10.96) 25.12 (14.57) P<0.001 
Percent of visits yielding 
prescriptions 59.15% 60.97% 59.94% n.s. 
Number of satisfying prescriptions 667,362 547,885 1,212,247 P<0.001 








                                                     
1All standard deviations reported are standard deviations of the original series values 
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4.2. Compliance Patterns 
Overall, the self-compliance rate (i.e., the ratio of self-compliance to the total number of satisfying 
prescriptions) was 57.2 percent (Table 2). Of the remaining prescriptions (the difference between the 
total number of satisfying prescriptions and the number of self-compliance prescriptions), the 
assisted-compliance rate was 29.8 percent (13 percent of the total number of satisfying prescriptions), 
leading to a 30 percent non-compliance rate and a 70 percent accumulated-compliance rate (the 
difference between 100 percent and the non-compliance rate). 
 
Table 2. Compliance Rate for Generic, Therapeutic and All Substitutes 
  Generic substitutes Therapeutic substitutes All Substitutes 
  Prescribed Rate 
% from 
total Prescribed Rate 
% from 




compliance 576,907 74% 74% 115,971 27% 27% 692,878 57% 57% 
Assisted- 
compliance 127,585 63% 16% 27,096 9% 6% 154,681 30% 13% 
Non-
compliance 74,864 10% 10% 289,824 67% 67% 364,688 30% 30% 
Total 779,356  100% 432,891  100% 1,212,247  100% 
 
The results in Table 2 show a significantly higher tendency to comply with HMO recommendations for 
generic substitutes than for therapeutic ones (p<0.001): for generic substitution, 74 percent self-
complied and 63 percent of the others assisted-complied, bringing the accumulated-compliance rate 
to 90 percent. For therapeutic substitution, however, only 27 percent self-complied, 8.5 percent of the 
rest assisted-complied, bringing the accumulated-compliance rate to only 33 percent. Thus, the non-
compliance rate was as high as 67 percent for therapeutic substitution but as low as 10 percent for 
generic substitution.  
4.3. Compliance Patterns and the Number of Recommended Substitutes 
We observed a positive and statistically significant correlation (r=0.201, p<0.01) between log time and 
the number of recommended substitute drugs on the list presented to the physician for therapeutic 
substitutions and non-compliance. Thus, physicians tended not to comply and to adhere to their initial 
choice when lists of recommended substitutes were longer, possibly avoiding the time required to 
examine a long list of drugs, particularly therapeutic ones. Hence, the optimal number of listed 
substitutes merits further investigation. 
4.4. Learning Curves 
Introduction of new drugs, one before data collection commenced, and one at Week 20 of data 
collection, or changes in recommended substitutes, allowed for the elicitation of learning curves over 
the 40 weeks of data collection. For introduction of new drugs, the learning period in Figures 2 and 3 
is characterized by a continuous increase in assisted compliance, as well as in self-compliance, 
toward stabilization. In Figure 3, the learning curve is steeper and accompanied by a sharp climb in 
assisted compliance. 
 
Also noteworthy is that a change in the drug policy of the HMO in the generic drug substitutes group 
resulted in a steep decrease in self-compliance, compensated for by a high and stable assisted 
compliance rate occurring within a week after policy change, while self-compliance remained low 
(Figure 4). This, however, is not the case in the therapeutic substitutes group, where the assisted 
compliance rate was low (Figure 5). Although self-compliance behaves similarly for the two groups, 
the assisted-compliance rate for the therapeutic substitute was not affected and remained low. 
Learning curves for drugs in drug groups where no such change occurred, show that self-compliance 
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increased slightly with time, whereas assisted compliance tended to remain rather stable, implying 
that the contribution of the system's notification capacity to compliance does not diminish over time, 
and there is merit in continued notifications for existing as well as for new drugs. 
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Figure 2. Learning Curve of a New Drug 
(Introduced Before Start of Data Collection) 
Figure 3. Learning Curve of a New Drug 
Introduced at Week 20 
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Figure 4. Reaction to Change in  
Recommendations (Generic Drug Substitute) 
Figure 5. Reaction to Change in  
Recommendations (Therapeutic Substitute) 
 
4.5. Resistance to Notifications 
In certain pharmaceutical groups, efforts to impact physicians' drug prescription habits failed, as 
depicted, for example, in Figure 6 for the antibiotics group. In one case, the HMO's effort to shift 
physicians’ prescription habits via notifications from one drug to another drug, which was not identical 
in its chemical formulation, resulted in a 5 percent self-compliance and a 2 percent assisted 
compliance rate. Evidently, physicians did not perceive the HMO-recommended drug as an adequate 
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Figure 6. Resistance to Notifications (Non-Compliance) 
4.6. Physician Response Time to Substitute Notifications 
We calculated average response time (elapsed between initial and final choices) using two methods: 
1) elimination of 10 percent of outliers (exhibiting an unrealistically long response time possibly due to 
pausing during the prescription process in order to accomplish another task), and 2) using log(time), 
an arithmetic procedure that shortens the upper tail relative to the lower tail. As displayed in Table 3, 
the results were quite similar for both methods: non-compliance took longer than assisted compliance 
in the generic substitution group (p<0.001), but in the therapeutic substitution group assisted 
compliance took significantly longer than non-compliance (p<0.001), in spite of the extra time required 
to fill the non-compliance form. 
 
Table 3. Time to Prescription Completion 
  Prescriptions Min Max Mean St. Dev.  
  Compliance Method 1: Eliminating 10% of outliers  
Generic Assisted- 126,532 0.08 29.99 2.61 3.05  
 Non- 74,449 0.12 29.97 2.84 2.74  
Therapeutic Assisted- 26,390 0.11 29.99 4.48 4.62  
 Non- 286,849 0.14 29.98 3.53 3.32  
Total   514,220 0.08 29.99 3.25 3.30  
   Method 2: log(time) 
Mean 
Time (sec) 
Generic Assisted- 127,585 -2.53 7.38 0.66 0.79 2.64 
  Non- 74,864 -2.12 6.60 0.84 0.63 2.83 
Therapeutic Assisted- 27,096 -2.21 8.49 1.21 0.94 5.19 
  Non- 289,824 -1.97 7.15 1.06 0.68 3.62 
Total   519,369 -2.53 8.49 0.94 0.74 3.35 
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4.7. Compliance Patterns and Physician Demographic Traits 
In a multinomial logistic regression, all independent factorial variables express odds of showing 
assisted compliance or non-compliance, respectively, compared to demonstrating self-compliance 
relative to the last category of the variable, with all other variables being equal. Continuous factors 
represent odds compared to an increase of one standard deviation. The model explained between 31 
percent (Cox and Snell) and 36.8 percent (Negelkerke pseudo R-square) of the variance in 
compliance type. Although all variables were statistically significant, substitution type, either generic 
or therapeutic, had a dominant effect on the model likelihood (χ2=392,116, df=2, p<0.001), with 
average visits per day with the physician (χ2=2,198, df=2, p<0.001), and physician's age (χ2=1,301, 
df=2, p<0.001) as second and third in effect size, albeit significantly smaller than substitution type. 
Patient age (χ2=469, df=2, p<0.001) and physician's HMO employment type (χ2=222, df=2, p<0.001) 
had a much lesser effect. All other variables had a negligible effect on the model likelihood. The odds 
(in the form of Exp(B)) entailed by the independent variables on assisted compliance and non-
compliance compared to self-compliance are summarized in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Results of the Multinomial Logistic Regression 
Assisted-compliance B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B) 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Intercept -1.47 0.011 17404.36 1 0.000    
Generic (vs. Therapeutic) -0.03 0.008 17.95 1 0.000 0.97 0.952 0.982 
Male (vs. Female) 0.04 0.007 27.79 1 0.000 1.04 1.022 1.050 
HMO-employed (vs. Self-
employed) 0.10 0.007 194.22 1 0.000 1.10 1.085 1.115 
GP (Vs. Specialist) -0.03 0.008 17.67 1 0.000 0.97 0.954 0.983 
Z-Patient age -0.02 0.003 32.26 1 0.000 0.98 0.975 0.988 
Z- Physician age -0.13 0.004 972.75 1 0.000 0.88 0.870 0.885 
Z - Physician tenure on the job  0.02 0.004 19.08 1 0.000 1.02 1.010 1.027 
Z- Average Visits per day -0.11 0.004 1070.25 1 0.000 0.89 0.886 0.898 
Eastern Europe education -0.14 0.008 326.83 1 0.000 0.87 0.858 0.884 
Western Europe education 0.08 0.010 72.00 1 0.000 1.09 1.067 1.109 
North America education 0.30 0.025 141.14 1 0.000 1.35 1.282 1.414 
South America education -0.14 0.019 54.95 1 0.000 0.87 0.839 0.903 
Non-compliance         
Intercept 0.91 0.009 10023.63 1 0.000    
Generic (vs. Therapeutic) -2.97 0.006 287228.91 1 0.000 0.05 0.051 0.052 
Male (vs. Female) 0.05 0.006 70.57 1 0.000 1.05 1.039 1.063 
HMO-employed (vs. Self-
employed) -0.01 0.006 0.67 1 0.413 0.99 0.983 1.007 
GP (Vs. Specialist) -0.01 0.008 1.84 1 0.175 0.99 0.974 1.005 
Z-Patient age 0.10 0.005 415.65 1 0.000 1.11 1.095 1.117 
Z- Physician age -0.01 0.004 10.77 1 0.001 0.99 0.981 0.995 
Z - Physician tenure on the job  -0.02 0.004 41.52 1 0.000 0.98 0.969 0.983 
Z- Average Visits per day 0.02 0.003 37.30 1 0.000 1.02 1.012 1.024 
Eastern Europe education 0.01 0.007 3.67 1 0.055 1.01 1.000 1.027 
Western Europe education -0.07 0.009 61.99 1 0.000 0.93 0.914 0.947 
North America education 0.24 0.024 102.79 1 0.000 1.27 1.214 1.333 
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4.8. Estimated Cost Savings 
We calculated a lower bound on drug cost savings in millions of New Israeli Shekel (NIS), with the 
exchange rate during the data collection period between 4.4 and 4.7 NIS to one US dollar. Cost 
calculations were based on the difference between the cost of the initial and final drug choices 
(private pharmacy prices, since the studied HMO refused to disclose paid prices), reflecting cost 
savings associated with assisted compliance. The total estimated cost of drugs in the 1.21 million 
satisfying prescriptions was 246.67 million NIS, of which 67 percent (165.78 Million NIS) was for 
chronic drugs and 33 percent (80.89 million NIS) for acute ones. Table 5 displays the estimated 
savings in monetary and percentage terms for acute (one time) and chronic (long term) drugs, 
keeping in mind savings achieved for the latter have a long-term cumulative impact due to dominance 
(67 percent) and life-long (chronic) consumption. As evident from Table 5, savings for chronic drugs 
(4.7 percent) were higher than for acute ones (2.39 percent). The lower savings on acute drugs may 
have stemmed from the fact that physicians generally did not comply with substitutes for antibiotics, 
the most commonly prescribed acute drugs, but the associated savings have a short-term effect 
anyway. Altogether, the estimated lower bound on cost savings amounted to 1.6 million NIS (an 
average of 3.6 percent savings). It is plausible that higher savings are achieved assuming that 
physicians become accustomed to prescribing generic drugs as a result of using the system, as 
evident by the large proportion of self-compliance behavior. 
 
Table 5. Savings (in Million NIS) 
 Acute Drugs Cost Chronic Drugs Cost 
 Initial choice Final choice Difference (%) Initial choice Final choice 
Difference 
(%) 
Generic substitutes 15.2 14.8 0.4 (2.39) 14.1 13.6 0.5 (4.72) 
Therapeutic substitutes 22.2 22.0 0.2 (1.46) 11.7 11.2 0.5 (4.63) 
Total 37.4 36.8 0.6 (1.46) 25.8 24.8 1.0 (4.68) 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
The spiraling spending on healthcare, in general, and the growing relative proportion of drug costs, in 
particular, merit special attention to measures to contain drug costs taken by healthcare providers and 
insurers. Several questions guided this study, the fundamental one being whether it is possible to gain 
physicians' compliance with drug prescription procedures preferred by the HMO to contain costs. In 
other words, when so notified by the system, do physicians comply with an HMO's notification, re-
think their initial drug choice, and prescribe instead an HMO-preferred substitute? Other questions 
stemming from the primary one are: Is compliance context-dependent? Does compliance depend on 
personal or environmental traits? Is such notification capacity associated with a financial contribution? 
In addition to addressing these issues, we reflect on the theoretical implications of the results, 
showing how a theory stemming from the behavioral and organizational sciences can contribute to 
explaining the clinical behavior of physicians. Added to the information systems aspect, it emphasizes 
the multi-disciplinary approach adopted in this study. 
5.1. Limitations 
A major limitation of this study is that the studied environment was dynamic during the data collection 
period, as is the case with any real business environment during a long period of 40 weeks. In this 
dynamic environment, changes were introduced both to drugs and to the organizational drug 
formulary, causing some interference. These changes were documented and eventually accounted 
for in the results, actually contributing to a broader understanding of physicians' behavior by allowing 
for example illustration and observation of learning curves. Another limitation lies in the fact that only 
about half of the drugs included in the HMO’s formulary had recommended substitutes, yet these 
were the most frequently prescribed drugs. An additional limitation is related to the use of private 
pharmacy prices for calculating drug costs, since the HMO was reluctant to disclose prices it pays for 
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drugs. Therefore, drug cost savings should be regarded as demonstration rather than actual 
monetary cost savings. Finally, we studied only one HMO, therefore, external validity may be 
questionable. Although more research is called for, we believe that the results can be generalized to 
other HMOs and healthcare providers, and that HMOs employing a similar intervention under 
comparable conditions can experience parallel results, particularly because no organizational or 
personal characteristics were found to affect compliance as strongly as the type of substitute. 
5.2. Summary of the Results 
The results show that physicians tended to comply more with notifications about generic substitute 
drugs than with notifications about therapeutic substitutes. The fact that new drugs and new drug 
recommendations have been introduced during the study period allowed drawing learning curves, 
showing that users of the notification capacity of the system learned to comply when convinced that a 
recommended substitute was an identical drug, demonstrating in these cases a steep learning curve 
and a high rate of compliance (self-compliance and assisted compliance combined). In contrast, the 
level of compliance when physicians doubted the adequacy of the recommended substitutes 
remained low throughout. Moreover, users spent a longer time examining therapeutic substitutes, 
evidently contemplating the adequacy of the recommendations. This result attests to the fact that 
compliance is not automatic but a cognitive and calculated process. Several demographic traits were 
found to marginally affect the various compliance types, the most notable of which are the effects of 
employment type, expertise, age, and work load. Finally, a cautious estimate of drug cost savings 
showed that such a system holds promise for significant cost containment.  
5.3. Theoretical Interpretation 
The fact that physicians tended to more readily comply with notifications about generic substitute 
drugs, and demonstrated a rather reactant behavior when asked to substitute a prescribed drug with 
a non-identical therapeutic substitute, shows that issues pertaining to procedural justice may have 
been involved. The difference in response time between the two types of substitutes likewise lends 
support to this interpretation. 
 
Substitution with generic drugs adheres more to the six criteria proposed by Leventhal (1976) for a 
procedure to be perceived fair, than does substitution with therapeutic drugs, because the generic 
drug is supposed to be identical to the patent drug. Therefore, this procedure can be perceived as 
free of bias (in spite of the fact that the HMO benefits from the substitute, yet seemingly at no 
professional or ethical harm), and it clearly conforms to prevailing standards of ethics and morality. 
The additional information provided for each drug on the HMO's formulary contributed to the 
perceptions of informational justice, and no interactional unfair conduct could have been associated 
with this substitution procedure.  
 
In contrast, there is strong evidence that therapeutic substitutes invoked perceptions of unjust 
procedures. Physicians might not have been convinced of the adequacy of the substitution, which 
could be an explanation for the extra time taken for this decision. For example, they could have 
perceived this recommendation as merely representing the vested interest of the HMO to save money 
at the expense of patients. Physicians could clearly regard such a notion as hindering their 
professional efficacy and autonomy, rendering a rather reactant response (Vashitz et al., 2009). It may 
very well be that these recommendations were additionally interpreted as unfair interactional conduct 
between HMO's management and physicians whose voice might not have been heard, or at least not 
adequately regarded (Lind & Tyler, 1988). Assuming that physicians perceive themselves as 
representing the well-being of their patients, they may also regard therapeutic substitute 
recommendations as interactional injustice toward their patients, as well as an informational unjust 
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5.4. Implications for Research 
Future research should investigate reasons for the elicited compliance behavior possibly by using 
scales measuring the organizational justice constructs (Colquitt, 2001) focusing on procedural, 
interactional, and informational justice, which are more relevant to this context. In-depth interviews 
with physicians who demonstrate various compliance behaviors can also greatly contribute to 
understanding their motivations. 
 
Although the three types of organizational justice seem more relevant to the investigated context, the 
negative effect of workload on compliance possibly suggests some form of distributive justice issue. It 
is plausible that overloaded physicians feel that resources and outcomes are not justly distributed, 
hence they develop a form of resentment expressed by not complying with a recommendation that, if 
adhered to, would save costs for the presumably unjust employer. We suggest this topic for future 
research. 
 
Further work along this trajectory will shed light on the important topic of adherence to administrative 
procedures. Results of such work should be of interest to researchers in healthcare administration, to 
management scientists who study organizational conduct in the current prevailing environments of 
knowledge and knowledgeable workers, and to designers of information systems who could use the 
results to develop organizational systems that would be more readily accepted by users if perceived 
as adhering to procedural, interactional, and informational justice.  
5.5. Implications for Practice 
HMOs and other healthcare providers, as well as providers of EMR, particularly drug prescription 
systems, can benefit from the results of this study in several ways. First, the results support the 
assertion that similar clinical information systems might be effective in reducing drug costs without 
impeding quality of healthcare. Nonetheless, compliance with drug notifications is neither automatic 
nor immediate, and physicians need to be convinced that the substitute notifications are based on 
good clinical practices and are not intended to promote cost savings at the expense of the quality of 
care. Furthermore, time is an important determinant for users when deciding whether or not to comply 
with a drug substitute notification in an EMR system. Hence, when designing such a system, every 
feature, key, and functionality needs to be carefully scrutinized for necessity, and its impact on 
response time must be evaluated. 
 
Our findings relating compliance to employment type and specialty suggest that HMOs might choose 
to act proactively and differentially toward increasing compliance via educational programs as well as 
incentives aimed at driving compliance up. In addition, HMOs can revisit and change substitute 
recommendations that are difficult for physicians to comply with. Workload has also been found to 
negatively affect compliance in certain instances. Employers should evaluate the benefits of a heavier 
workload against lost cost savings. 
 
In conclusion, this study illustrates the contribution of an EMR system with a substitute notification 
capacity built into a drug prescription module in a generally complex and difficult field, where benefits, 
in general, and economic impacts, in particular, are not easily obtained and demonstrated. However, 
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Appendices 
Appendix A. 
Exhibit A-1. Alerts to the Existence of a Preferred Substitute 




The drug you are prescribing has a 
substitute that is preferred by 
experts in the organization. 
Therefore, please justify your 
choice in the following form. Do you 
want to choose another drug?
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Appendix B. 
Exhibit B-1. A Digital Form to Justify Drug Prescription When not Complying with Drug 
Substitute Recommendation 
Justification for 
prescribing this drug and 
not the preferred 
substitute
An interaction with 
another drug is expected
Past failure with one or 
more drugs in the 
preferred drugs list
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